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#MeToo as a Revolutionary Cascade 
Cass R. Sunstein† 
ABSTRACT 
Why do revolutions happen? Why are they so difficult to anticipate? Some of the 
most instructive answers point to three factors: (1) preference falsification on the 
part of rebels or revolutionaries, (2) diverse thresholds for revolutionary activity, 
and (3) social interactions that either do or do not trigger the relevant thresholds. 
Under conditions of actual or perceived injustice or oppression, true preferences 
and thresholds are probably impossible to observe; social interactions are impossi-
ble to anticipate. Even if we could observe factors (1) and (2), the challenge of an-
ticipating factor (3) would make it essentially impossible to foresee revolutions. For 
all their differences, and with appropriate qualifications, the French Revolution, 
the Russian Revolution, the fall of Communism, and the Arab Spring were unan-
ticipated largely for these reasons. And in light of factors (1), (2), and (3), it is haz-
ardous to think that the success of successful revolutions is essentially inevitable. 
(The same is true for the failure of unsuccessful revolutions.) History is only run 
once, so we will never know, but small or serendipitous factors might have initiated 
(or stopped) a revolutionary cascade. The #MeToo movement can be seen as such 
a cascade, marked by factors (1), (2), and (3). For that movement, as for successful 
revolutions, we might be able to point to some factors as necessary conditions, but 
hindsight is hazardous. It is also important to note that in revolutions, as in #Me-
Too, preferences and beliefs are not merely revealed; they are also transformed. 
Revolutionary activity, large or small, puts issues about preference falsification, 
experience falsification, and adaptive preferences in a new light. 
I. UNPREDICTABLE REVOLUTIONS 
Why do revolutions happen? Why are they so hard to anticipate? 
Why do they seem to come out of nowhere? My aim here is to cast some 
light on these questions and, in the process, to help explain #MeToo. I 
shall begin with some general remarks on revolutions and their genesis 
 
 †  Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. This essay was presented at a 
conference at the University of Chicago Legal Forum: Law in the Era of #MeToo, in November 
2018. Readers are invited to make allowances for an essay that originally served as the basis for 
an oral presentation. Elise Baranouski provided superb research assistance and valuable com-
ments. 
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and then turn to #MeToo—which is not quite a revolution, of course, 
but which has something in common with one. 
To vindicate the premise of my opening questions: Lenin was 
stunned by the success and speed of the Russian Revolution.1 Tocque-
ville reported that no one foresaw the French Revolution.2 The Iranian 
Revolution of 1789 was unanticipated.3 More recently, the Arab Spring 
was unanticipated by many of the best analysts in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and elsewhere.4 Puzzlingly, revolutions seem to 
come in waves; they spread rapidly within countries and across coun-
tries, for reasons that remain unclear.5 It is tempting, and not unhelp-
ful, to speak of demonstration and contagion effects. But what exactly 
do those terms mean?6 In what sense is revolution, or some kind of re-
volt, “contagious”? 
A. Three Factors 
Some of the most illuminating explanatory work on this subject 
points to three factors: (a) preference falsification, (b) diverse thresh-
olds, and (c) interdependencies.7 When the three are taken together, the 
difficulty of anticipating such movements, or revolutions in particular, 
becomes less puzzling. I will introduce complications in due course, but 
these three factors tell us much that we need to know. 
1. Preference falsification 
Preference falsification exists when people conceal, or do not reveal, 
what they actually prefer.8 They might say they like the existing regime 
 
 1 Asef Bayat, The Arab Spring and its Surprises, 44 DEV. & CHANGE 587, 587–88 (2013). 
 2 Id. at 587. 
 3 Id. at 588. 
 4 Id. at 587. 
 5 KURT WEYLAND, MAKING WAVES: DEMOCRATIC CONTENTION IN EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICA SINCE THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848, 1–7 (2014). 
 6 See id. at 7–11, for valuable discussion, emphasizing the availability and representative-
ness heuristics. Weyland’s exploration of availability and representativeness has implications for 
rebellions of many kinds, and not merely revolutions; #MeToo could easily be studied with refer-
ence to those heuristics. I offer some brief remarks at various points below. 
 7 See generally Timur Kuran, The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises, 100 AM. J. 
SOC. 1528 (1995); Timur Kuran & Diego Romero, The Logic of Revolutions, in 2 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC CHOICE (Roger D. Congleton et al. eds., 2018); MEROUAN MEKOUAR, 
PROTECT AND MASS MOBILIZATION: AUTHORITARIAN COLLAPSE AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN NORTH 
AFRICA (1st ed. 2016); Muzammil Hussain & Philip Howard, What Best Explains Successful Protest 
Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring, 15 INT’L STUD. REV. 48 (2013) (empha-
sizing the importance of communications technologies). 
 8 TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE 
FALSIFICATION 4–5 (1995). The literature on “informational cascades” is also relevant, but revolu-
tions go well beyond those. See generally Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, 
Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Susanne 
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when they despise it. They might silence themselves. Their friends and 
neighbors might have no idea what they actually think. To that extent, 
people live in a world of pluralistic ignorance, in which they do not know 
about the preferences of others.9 Under regimes that are oppressive (in 
one or another respect), preference falsification is common. Because of 
oppression, it is difficult to learn what people actually think.10 
For those who want to predict revolution or revolt, the problem is 
that the law, or social norms, can draw a wedge between private pref-
erences and public preferences.11 The law matters if citizens lack free-
dom of speech and if dissent is punished. Social norms matter if people 
will be ostracized, in some sense, if they reveal their distress, anger, 
indignation, or dissatisfaction. Perhaps they will be shunned; perhaps 
powerful people will punish them in one or another way; perhaps their 
employment prospects will be compromised. In any of these cases, peo-
ple might not merely silence themselves; they might say that they are 
happy with the status quo when they are not. Consider some chilling 
words from a computer programmer from Syria: 
When you meet somebody coming out of Syria for the first time, 
you start to hear the same sentences. That everything is okay 
inside Syria, Syria is a great country, the economy is doing 
great . . . It’ll take him like six months, up to one year, to become 
a normal human being, to say what he thinks, what he feels. 
Then they might start . . . whispering. They won’t speak loudly. 
That is too scary. After all that time, even outside Syria you feel 
that someone is listening, someone is recording.12 
2. Diverse thresholds 
Different people will require different levels of social support before 
they will rebel or say what they actually think.13 Some people might 
require no support at all; they are rebels by nature. They might be cou-
rageous, committed, or foolhardy. Call them the “zeroes.” They might 
 
Lohmann, I Know You Know He or She Knows We Know You Know They Know: Common Knowled- 
ge and the Unpredictability of Informational Cascades, in POLITICAL COMPLEXITY: NONLINEAR MO- 
DELS OF POLITICS (Diana Richards ed., 2000). 
 9 See, e.g., Kuran, supra note 8, for an especially good account see also D. Garth Taylor, Plu-
ralistic Ignorance and the Spiral of Silence: A Formal Analysis, 46 PUB. OPINION Q. 311 (1982); 
For a valuable account with special reference to law, see RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE 
POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS, 136–62 (2015). 
 10 See generally WENDY PEARLMAN, WE CROSSED A BRIDGE AND IT TREMBLED: VOICES FROM 
SYRIA (2017), for first-hand reports. 
 11 See Kuran, supra note 8, at 84–102. 
 12 Pearlman, supra note 10, at 4. 
 13 See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420 
(1978), for the classic account; Kuran, supra note 8, at 60–83. 
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well turn out to be isolated; no one may join them, in which case they 
might look radical, foolhardy, or even crazy. Other people might require 
a little support; they will not move unless someone else does, but if 
someone does, they are prepared to rebel as well. Call them the “ones.” 
Others might require more than a little; they are the “twos.” The twos 
will do nothing unless they see the zeroes and the ones, but if they do, 
they will rebel as well. The twos are followed by the threes, and the 
fours, and the tens, and the hundreds, and the thousands, all the way 
up to the infinites (defined as people who will not oppose the regime, no 
matter what).14 
Outside of science fiction, it is not possible to see people’s thresh-
olds. People may not quite know whether they themselves are threes, 
fours, or tens. They might turn out to be surprised. Consider the rele-
vant words of John Adams, writing with evident amazement about the 
American Revolution: “Idolatry to Monarchs, and servility to Aristocrat-
ical Pride . . . was never so totally eradicated from so many Minds in so 
short a Time.”15 
3. Interdependencies 
Interdependencies point to the fact that the behavior of the ones, 
the twos, the threes, and so forth will depend crucially on who, if any-
one, is seen to have done what. Suppose that the various citizens are in 
a kind of temporal queue. The zeroes go first, then the ones, then the 
twos, then the threes, and so forth. (Or perhaps vice-versa. Or perhaps 
it is all random.) Under imaginable assumptions, a rebellion will occur, 
but only given the right distribution of thresholds and the right kind of 
visibility.16 If the ones see the zeroes, they will rebel, and if the twos see 
the ones, they, too, will rebel, and if the threes see the twos, they will 
join them.17 If the conditions are just right, almost everyone will rebel.18 
But it is important to see that the conditions have to be just right. 
Suppose that there are no zeroes, or that no one sees any zeroes. If so, 
no rebellion will occur. If there are few ones, the regime is likely to be 
safe. If most people are tens or hundreds or thousands, the same is true, 
even if there are some ones, twos, three, fours, and so forth. 
 
 14 The infinites deserve some attention. Their motivations are undoubtedly varied; they may 
involve identity, habit, fear, loyalty, or something else. 
 15 GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 169 (1993). 
 16 See generally Granovetter, supra note 13, for the clearest explanation. 
 17 Id. at 1424–25. 
 18 See id. at 1431. See also Heng Chen & Wing Suen, Falling Dominoes: A Theory of Rare 
Events and Crisis Contagion, 8 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECON. 228, 239 (2016), for an emphasis on the 
importance of beliefs and on their fragility. 
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4. Unpredictability 
We should now be able to see three reasons why revolutions may 
be impossible to predict. First, we do not know what people’s prefer-
ences are. By hypothesis, they cannot be observed. Second, we do not 
know what people’s thresholds are. They too are unobservable. Third, 
we cannot anticipate social interactions—who will say or do what and 
exactly when. It is important to emphasize the third point.19 Even if we 
could identify people’s preferences and specify their thresholds, we 
would not be able to know, in advance, the nature of social interactions. 
The point bears on revolutions in general and on #MeToo in particular. 
In the case of oppressive societies, it may be possible to know that peo-
ple are widely miserable or dissatisfied. In the context of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment, it is reasonable to assume that dissatisfaction 
is widespread. But that is not enough. 
These points suggest that even if new technologies make it increas-
ingly possible to identify private preferences—for example, by exploring 
people’s online behavior—we will still not be able to predict revolu-
tions.20 To be sure, we would know something important: a revolution 
is more likely if people secretly hate the regime. We could certainly 
learn from that fact. Secret opposition may be necessary for revolution, 
but it is not sufficient. To know what will happen, we would need to 
know about people’s thresholds as well. As I have noted, obtaining that 
knowledge will inevitably be difficult; it might be impossible. And even 
if we overcome that challenge, we would need to know who interacts 
with whom, and who sees whom, and when. No one has that kind of 
prescience. But the answers to those questions may well determine out-
comes.21 
These points help explain not only why revolutions are unpredict-
able but also why they are often a product of seemingly small, random, 
or serendipitous factors—of who did what when, or who heard what 
when, or whether some kind of butterfly flapped its wings at the right 
moment.22 We might think that Regime “A” was bound to fall, but it 
 
 19 See generally Matthew Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds & Duncan J. Watts, Experimental 
Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCI. 854, 854–56 
(2006), emphasizing the unpredictability of social exchange. 
 20 See generally SETH STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES: BIG DATA, NEW DATA, AND 
WHAT THE INTERNET CAN TELL US ABOUT WHO WE REALLY ARE (2017). 
 21 See Salganik, supra note 19, at 854–56, for relevant findings. See also Matthew Salganik & 
Duncan Watts, Leading the Herd Astray: An Experimental Study of Self-fulfilling Prophecies in an 
Artificial Cultural Market, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 338, 338–55 (2008); Matthew Salganik & Duncan 
Watts, Web-Based Experiments for the Study of Collective Social Dynamics in Cultural Markets, 1 
TOPICS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 439, 439–68 (2009). 
 22 See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS (2017); PAUL ORMEROD, 
BUTTERFLY ECONOMICS: A NEW GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1998). 
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really was not. It happened to fall. The same is true if it does not fall. It 
happened not to fall.23 Counterfactual histories can be illuminating in-
sofar as they illustrate this point.24 
B. Complications 
This is a very simple account, of course, and it needs to be compli-
cated in multiple ways. For present purposes, consider these points. 
First, people’s preferences may be adaptive to the status quo.25 Peo-
ple might not have to work hard to shut themselves up. They might not 
even think that the status quo is bad. Consider these words from a 
woman in North Korea: “It never occurred to me that I could or would 
want to do anything about it. It was just how things are.”26 The most 
important word here is “want.” To be sure, fully adaptive preferences 
are an extreme case, even under conditions of real fear.27 It might be 
better to speak of partially adaptive preferences, in which people are 
aware that something is wrong, or bad, or horrific, but the awareness 
takes the form of a small voice in the head, to which people do not pay 
a great deal of attention. But the idea of preference falsification is too 
simple when people’s preferences are an artifact of the status quo. 
Whether we are dealing with preference falsification, adaptive prefer-
ences, or partially adaptive preferences cannot be answered in the ab-
stract. 
Second, the very word “preferences” is under-descriptive or perhaps 
misleading. It might be better to speak of people’s beliefs, experiences, 
or values. Under an oppressive regime, people might believe that terri-
ble injustices are committed or that their values are being violated. To 
be sure, they are also concealing or falsifying what they prefer, but that 
is hardly an adequate account of what is happening. They are conceal-
ing or falsifying their deepest convictions. They are concealing or falsi-
fying what actually happened to them. (Talk about fake news). 
Third, and crucially, rebels are not doing a full analysis of the costs 
and benefits of rebellion. They rely on mental shortcuts, or heuristics, 
in deciding what to do and when.28 For that reason, available incidents 
 
 23 To be sure, the factors that underlie any fall, or failure to fall, deserve close attention. 
 24 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Historical Explanations Always Involve Counterfactual His-
tory, 10 J. PHIL. HIST. 433 (Issue 3, 2016). 
 25 See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY, 25 (1983). 
 26 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea #MeToo Voices: ‘They Consider Us Toys,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/world/asia/north-korea-women-metoo.html [https://pe 
rma.cc/VLP5-CES3]. 
 27 Cf. SERENE KHADER, ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT (STUDIES IN 
FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY) (2011) (discussing the complexity of the idea of adaptive preferences in the 
face of personal agency). 
 28 See Weyland, supra note 5, at 35–38. 
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or outcomes might affect probability judgments.29 If a town suddenly 
falls to rebels, or if a government collapses, other rebels might believe 
that the probability of success is high.30 The availability heuristic, as it 
is called, works with emphatically social forces, producing availability 
cascades, as specific incidents or results move rapidly from one person 
to another, altering judgments about what is likely to happen.31 A rev-
olutionary movement might be fueled or halted by an availability cas-
cade. 
Fourth, fate is not only in the hands of revolutionaries. There is 
also the regime, and there are also counterrevolutionaries, and there 
may well be counterrevolution. As a revolutionary cascade starts to de-
velop, the regime is likely to do something. For example, it might try to 
entrench pluralistic ignorance by hiding or preventing visible rebellion 
or mass demonstrations.32 It might allow dissent and disagreement—
until they become too visible.33 It might make concessions, hoping to 
retain power. It might try to dissuade the hundreds and the thousands. 
It might bring out its guns. It might kill people.34 If the goal of the re-
gime is to maintain power, the choice among these options can be very 
difficult. For example, violence might be effective in quelling revolution, 
but it might also foment more of it.35 
II. #METOO 
Turn to #MeToo in this light. All three conditions are met. The 
qualifications are relevant as well. 
First, with respect to sexual assault and sexual harassment, pref-
erence falsification has run rampant.36 Victims have silenced them-
selves.37 In some cases, they have said that all is or was well, when it is 
 
 29 Kurt Weyland, The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary 
Wave of 1848?, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 917, 921 (2012). 
 30 See id. 
 31 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683, 685 (1999). 
 32 Gary King, Jennifer Pan & Margaret E. Roberts, How the Chinese Government Fabricates 
Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 484, 
496 (2017). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See generally Pearlman, supra note 10. 
 35 See Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, A Theory of Civil Disobedience, NAT’L BUREAU 
OF ECON., 2–3, 13–17 (2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21338 [https://perma.cc/8N4R-339M]. 
 36 But see Catharine MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html [https:// 
perma.cc/NQ78-LWD7] (“Women have been saying these things forever. It is the response to them 
that has changed.”). MacKinnon is surely right on this point. It is also true that some women said 
these things privately rather than publicly—and some spoke to no one at all. 
 37 Timur Kuran, who introduced the concept of preference falsification, has used the concept 
to explain the pre-#MeToo silence around sexual harassment and assault, drawing comparisons to 
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or was anything but that.38 These points are true and important, but 
they are inadequate and under-descriptive. What many women (and 
many, but fewer, men) did not reveal—what they kept private—was a 
set of experiences, alongside evaluative judgments about those experi-
ences. We might want to speak, in the case of #MeToo, of experience 
falsification. Self-silencing has been important, of course, but actual fal-
sification of experience—with an employer, for example—might be 
more searing.39 
Experience falsification or self-silencing can be a product of many 
different factors. With respect to sexual violence or sexual harassment, 
it may be a product of a rational calculation of likely costs and benefits, 
given the risks of disclosure. Some women who did come forward with 
accusations of assault and harassment pre-#MeToo have been ridiculed 
or disparaged, or worse, providing a signal to other victims about what 
might happen if they spoke out and thus tilting the cost-benefit analysis 
in favor of staying silent.40 If cases of this kind were highly visible and 
thus cognitively “available,” the availability heuristic would lead people 
to think that probability of damage or harm from disclosure could be 
quite high. But we need not invoke the availability heuristic. A 2003 
study, cited by the EEOC in 2016, indicated that 75% of employees who 
spoke out against workplace mistreatment faced some form of retalia-
tion.41 To the extent that victims of sexual harassment were aware of 
the risk of retaliation, that awareness provided a reason to falsify their 
experiences or at least not to speak about them. 
Second, different women had and have different thresholds for dis-
closing their experiences and their judgments. Some women are ones, 
others are twos, others are tens, and others are hundreds or thousands. 
 
the fear-induced preference falsification that preserved communist rule for decades. Shankar Ve-
dantam, The Psychological Forces Behind a Cultural Reckoning: Understanding #MeToo, (NPR: 
Hidden Brain Radio Broadcast Feb. 5, 2018) (in conversation with Princeton psychologist Betsy 
Paluck), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=582698111 [https://per 
ma.cc/933R-WW23] (“KURAN: For decades, communism survived by making the populations it 
ruled afraid to express opposition to the principles of communism and express opposition to the 
dictatorships that were running the Soviet bloc countries. VEDANTAM: The silence around Har-
vey Weinstein’s sexual misconduct operated in the same way. KURAN: It was an open secret for 
decades, we’ve learned, in Hollywood and in circles that Harvey Weinstein traveled in, that he was 
a predator of young women, but also, that if anybody called him out on this, he would ruin their 
careers.”) 
 38 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed, 85 SOC. RES.: AN INT’L Q. 73, 73–92 (2018). 
 39 A vivid treatment of experience falsification is THE TALE (Gamechanger Films et al. 2018), 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B07D8MCN2B/ref=atv_feed_catalog [https://perma.cc/MPR5 
-C8DZ]. 
 40 Vedantam, supra note 37. 
 41 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSME- 
NT IN THE WORKPLACE: REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, 16 (2016),  
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ8B-TE3 
G]. 
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For one reason or another, some may be infinites.42 (They might be 
frightened; they might have some kind of loyalty to the perpetrator; 
they might not want their lives to be disrupted; they might cherish their 
privacy.) Some might not have clarity on what their thresholds are. 
They, and we, learn about that only ex post. Consider the following 
words from Beverly Young Nelson, who accused Republican Senate can-
didate Roy Moore of having sexually assaulted her in 1977: 
I thought that I was Mr. Moore’s only victim. I would probably 
have taken what Mr. Moore did to me to my grave, had it not 
been for the courage of four other women that were willing to 
speak out about their experiences with Mr. Moore. Their courage 
has inspired me to overcome my fear.43 
Third, social interactions are, and continue to be, crucial to #Me-
Too. Under certain conditions, the threes and the fours would silence 
themselves, because the ones and the twos were silent too. But #MeToo 
has benefited from the visibility of those who spoke out and the multiple 
interactions made possible by social media. Within 24 hours of Alyssa 
Milano’s initial tweet, 45% of all U.S. Facebook users had friends in 
their networks who had posted with #MeToo.44 Once the ones and the 
twos spoke out, the threes and the fours felt safer or emboldened. 
It is important to say that this account is barebones and highly 
stylized, and that it misses a great deal. I emphasize five points here. 
First, the #MeToo movement is not opposing a regime, at least not in 
the usual sense.45 Rather than rebelling against a government, the 
women (and men) of #MeToo are uniting around a similar or common 
experience and rebelling against a practice and also against institutions 
(some of which may be in government). While cascading accusations 
against individual perpetrators have been crucial—for example, more 
 
 42 See Lisa Bonos, Not Everyone with a #MeToo is Posting Their Story. Here’s Why Some Are 
Refraining, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2017/1 
0/19/not-everyone-with-a-metoo-is-posting-their-story-heres-why-some-are-refraining/?noredirect 
=on&utm_term=.502bb45e04b7 [https://perma.cc/23KN-RBSA], for insights from the “infinites.” 
 43 See Text of Beverly Young Nelson’s Accusation against Roy Moore, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 13, 20-
17), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/us/politics/text-beverly-young-nelson-statement.html [h  
ttps://perma.cc/6X4F-FZAD]  (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
 44 See More than 12M “Me Too” Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24 Hours, CBS NEWS 
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-more-than-12-million-facebook-posts-com-
ments-reactions-24-hours [https://perma.cc/P33G-HKUZ]. Note also that it might be easier to use 
Twitter, to reveal an experience or to state agreement, than to speak offline, or to attempt to show 
support or to attract attention that way. 
 45 But see Ella Nilsen, More than 100 Members of Congress Want the Oversight Committee to 
Investigate Trump, VOX (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/12/16766 
800/democratic-congress-members-trump-investigation-women [https://perma.cc/3VYD-GCSR] (s- 
uggesting that, for some, #MeToo may be viewed as a tool to oust President Trump, who has been 
accused of sexual assault by multiple women). 
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than two dozen women spoke out against Roger Ailes before he was 
ousted at Fox News—the larger movement might be understood as a 
challenge to a system of sex discrimination and to institutions that en-
gage in or perpetuate it.46 To the extent that we are speaking of insti-
tutions, it is not so much of a stretch to say that regime change, at least 
of a sort, is involved. 
Second, there is the question of granularity—of exactly what hap-
pened, and when, and why. Answering that question would reveal not 
only informative detail but also conceptual surprises. 
Third, there is the crucial role of salience in the #MeToo move-
ment.47 Some twos are different from other twos, and the same is true 
for threes and fours, for one reason: their own statements and actions 
are especially salient. In the context of #MeToo, Ashley Judd might 
have made all the difference.48 Catharine MacKinnon has suggested 
that Judd’s celebrity and salience were not the only thing that made her 
an ideal first-mover; she was also, importantly, “somebody whose cred-
ibility is not readily attackable and who wasn’t suing at the time.”49 In 
revolutionary movements in general, what is salient, and what is cog-
nitively available, greatly matters. As I have suggested, rebels do not 
make elaborate cost-benefit analyses. They use mental short-cuts, and 
availability is especially important.50 
Fourth, descriptive social norms, which capture what people actu-
ally do, greatly matter. Other things being equal, people are more likely 
to change their behavior to comply with a norm if they believe that most 
other people are compliant, and less likely to do so if they believe that 
most other people are noncompliant. A prominent study found that vis-
itors to a national park who saw signs informing them that many past 
visitors had stolen petrified wood from the park became more likely to 
steal petrified wood—and that visitors who saw signs informing them 
that the vast majority of visitors had left the wood in the park became 
less likely to steal petrified wood.51 The #MeToo movement appears to 
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have benefited from a shift in descriptive norms, suggesting that speak-
ing out or objecting is not inconsistent with usual behavior. 
While it seems highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that attention to widespread harassment will serve to inform (some) 
male perpetrators that they are simply behaving like many other men, 
thus reducing their incentive to behave differently.52 But it is also true 
that, to the extent #MeToo succeeds in changing norms, a new (and ben-
eficial) wave of preference falsification may lead potential harassers to 
condemn the behavior rather than to support it.53 There is much to be 
learned about this topic.54 
Finally, #MeToo is not simply about the revelation of preferences,
experiences, beliefs, and values. It is also about the transformation of 
preferences, beliefs, and values—most obviously on the part of perpe-
trators, but equally relevantly on the part of victims. Any social move-
ment helps to alter preferences, beliefs, and values. It casts a new light 
on past experiences. It does not merely elicit preexisting judgments. It 
produces fresh ones.55 Part of the point of #MeToo, and one of its 
achievements, is to turn a sense of embarrassment and shame into a 
sense of dignity. 
Recall the statement from a computer programmer from Syria: 
When you meet somebody coming out of Syria for the first time, 
you start to hear the same sentences. That everything is 
okay . . . It’ll take like six months, up to one year, to become a 
normal human being, to say what he thinks, what he feels. Then 
they might start . . . whispering. They won’t speak loudly.56 
But eventually they might. 
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